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This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, 
continuous action generalization of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When time preferences 
are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be 
achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with the group’s size 
and structure? For an arbitrary distribution of discount factors, we characterize the 
maximal average co-operation (MAC) likelihood of this game. The MAC likelihood is 
the highest average level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium 
paths, that the group can achieve. The MAC likelihood is shown to be increasing in 
monotone shifts, and decreasing in mean preserving spreads, of the distribution of 
discount factors. The latter suggests that more heterogeneous groups are less 
cooperative on average. Finally, we establish weak conditions under which the MAC 
likelihood exhibits increasing returns to scale when discounting is heterogeneous. That 
is, larger groups are more cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. By contrast, when 
the group has a common discount factor, the MAC likelihood is invariant to group size. 
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Successful cooperation at some level is required in any group. In most contexts, teams,
clubs, and partnerships function most eﬀectively when their members get along with one
another. When they do not, substantial social conﬂicts often result.
This paper examines characteristics of group cooperation in a repeated, collective action
environment. Speciﬁcally, we study an n-person repeated game that resembles a repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. At each stage, each member of the group can choose some (nor-
malized) level of eﬀort or contribution in the unit interval which indicates how cooperative
he is toward other members of the group. An individual is better oﬀ the more cooperative
are the other members in the aggregate. However, each has a (static) incentive to behave
uncooperatively.
How can successful cooperation be determined for this group? Speciﬁcally, how “much”
cooperation can this group achieve? Moreover, how does the level of achievable cooperation
respond to changes in the size and composition of the group?
One standard view of group cooperation, dating at least back to Olson (1965), is that (a)
group decisions typically entail free rider problems that limit/prevent cooperative outcomes,
and (b) these problems are worse in larger groups than in smaller ones. In the context of a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the view expressed in (a) is more or less correct when
discounting is large. That is, when members are uniformly impatient, the incentives of the
stage game take over and, consequently, joint cooperation cannot be sustained. On the
other hand, a polar view of group cooperation is obtained when the members are uniformly
patient. The Folk Theorem, according to which any feasible and individually rational payoﬀ
proﬁle is sustainable if all group members are suﬃciently and uniformly patient, provides
an alternative conclusion to (a).1 Namely, the collective action problem is easily resolved
in the limit as the common discount factor approaches one. Hence, equilibria exist in which
all group members are cooperative each period. As for (b), group size plays no role either
when players are uniformly patient or uniformly impatient.2
These claims are more diﬃcult to evaluate in the intermediate cases where discount
factors are bounded away from either zero or one. Moreoever, neither of these polar cases
can eﬀectively evaluate these and other issues when discounting is heterogeneous. For
example, what eﬀect does a mix of patient and impatient group members have on attaining
cooperative outcomes? Presumably, collective decision problems occur in these cases as
well.
To address these questions, we therefore depart from the traditional focus on uniformly
1Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) is a standard reference.
2To be fair, Olson (1965) outlined several reasons for ineﬀectiveness of larger groups which are not
considered here. See Section 5 for an extended discussion.
1patient players in repeated games.3 Instead, we examine a measure of cooperation in a
group whose members possess arbitrary discount factors.
Consider a group with n members. Let δi denote the discount factor for member, i =
1,...,n.L e tδ =( δ1,...,δn) denote the proﬁle of discount factors. Consider, in a repeated
game of perfect monitoring, the set of stationary, subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE), i.e.,
equilibria in which the same action proﬁle is taken each period. Let pi ∈ [0,1] indicate
the level of cooperation by group member i each period in an SSPE. For instance, pi may
indicate a (normalized) level of eﬀort by member i. A convenient alternative interpretation
is that pi is the probability that member i a s s i g n st oad i s c r e t e ,“ c o o p e r a t i v e ”a c t i o ni na
binary action game.4 Now consider a proﬁle of actions, p =( p1,...,p n), that maximizes






over all SSPE paths. The value of this program is a level of cooperation, p∗(n,δ) ∈ [0,1],
which we call the maximal average cooperation (MAC) likelihood. The maximal average
cooperation (MAC) likelihood describes the highest average level of cooperation attainable
by the group each period when behavior is stationary.
We are interested in the MAC likelihood, rather than in group welfare, because the
former is calculated from behavior directly. To an external observer who may not observe the
players’ payoﬀs, the MAC likelihood provides an objective measure of group performance.
A manager of a ﬁrm who knows nothing about the details of the payoﬀs of his divisional
workers, may nevertheless measure the eﬀectiveness of the group by examining their average
cooperative eﬀort.
Even so, using the MAC likelihood as a measure of attainable cooperation is restrictive
because stationary equilibria entail some loss of generality when discounting is heteroge-
neous. For one thing, a recent paper by Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) shows that the feasible
payoﬀ set changes when discounting is heterogeneous. In particular, there are typically
equilibrium payoﬀs outside the convex hull of the stage game payoﬀ set if individuals are
suﬃciently but heterogeneously patient. The intuition is that relatively impatient players
can receive favorable payoﬀs early on, while relatively patient ones receive rewards later in
the game. For another, the MAC likelihood when the interpretation of p is as a mixed action
proﬁle is problematic: when discount factors are bounded away from one, the assumption
that mixed action histories are observable is no longer without loss of generality. For this
reason, the interpretation of p as a proﬁle of continuous pure actions is the more desirable
one.5
3Other work which departs from the uniform patience assumption is discussed later in this Section.
4T h el a t t e ri n t e r p r e t a t i o na s s u m e st h a tt h eh i s t o r yo fm i x e da c t i o np r o ﬁles are observable.
5The mixed action interpretation is only used in the analysis as a convenience.
2On the other hand, the restriction to stationary equilibria may be justiﬁed on at least
four grounds. First, so little is known about equilibria when discounting is bounded away
from either one or zero that it seems sensible to start with an approach that admits a
transparent comparison with standard models. In particular, because the stationary payoﬀ
set does not change if discounting is heterogeneous, stationary equilibria can isolate changes
due to equilibrium behavior rather than due to changes in feasibility constraints.
Second, the stationary equilibria facilitate objective measurement of the group by an
outside observer. This is especially relevant to a neutral observer or to a personell manager
of the ﬁrm. By contrast, nonstationary equilibria present problems for measurement since it
is unclear how cooperation early in the game should be weighted against cooperation later
if there is no common discount factor.
Third, stationary equilibria – especially the variety studied here – are particularly
simple to implement. Using example of the personell manager again, the ﬁrm may require
cooperation from a team of emplyees, but be unable to monitor their performance directly.
Hence, equilibria of low complexity that require only self-monitoring may be desirable.
Finally, these stationary equilibria will, for our purposes, prove useful as they highlight
potential social conﬂicts generated by the interaction of patient and impatient individuals.
Even as an imperfect estimate, the MAC likelihood eﬀectively summarizes these conﬂicts.
Section 2 describes the case of two players. There the MAC likelihood is explicitly calcu-
lated. In the n player case in Section 3, we prove that the MAC likelihood is characterized
by a maximal ﬁxed point of a particular function. Properties of this function provide critical
information as to how cooperation varies with size and the composition of the group.
Our main results are in Section 4. The ﬁndings fall into two categories: (1) the eﬀect on
cooperation when the composition of the group changes (holding size ﬁxed); (2) the eﬀect
on cooperation when group size changes.
One rather expected ﬁnding from the ﬁrst category is that the MAC likelihood is in-
creasing in monotone shifts in the distribution of time preferences. More patient groups are
more cooperative.
Al e s so b v i o u sﬁnding is that mean preserving spreads reduce the MAC likelihood.
Group heterogeneity lowers cooperation. Greater social conﬂict is generated by greater
conﬂict in time preferences of the members. Roughly, the result comes from the fact that
an individual’s level of cooperation in a “MAC" equilibrium turns out to be concave in his
own discount factor. Hence, increments to cooperation are decreasing in one’s own patience.
The main result of the second category establishes suﬃcient conditions under which
the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing returns to scale. Suppose an n-person group with
discounting proﬁle δ
n doubles in size holding everything else, including the distribution
of discount factors, constant. Then the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing returns if
3p∗(2n,δ
2n) >p ∗(n,δ
n). More generally, for any scale factor α, the MAC likelihood exhibits
increasing (decreasing) returns to scale if
p
∗(αn,δ
αn) > (<) p
∗(n,δ
n) (2)
In words, increasing returns to scale exist if the average level of cooperation of the scaled
up group exceeds that of the original group. If p∗(n,δ
n) lies strictly between 0 and 1, we
show that increasing (decreasing) returns to scale exist if all individuals’ discount factors
lie above (below) a certain threshold.
The result demonstrates, however, a certain propensity toward increasing, rather than
decreasing, returns. Speciﬁcally, the MAC likelihood is shown to exhibit increasing returns
if two conditions hold. First, the average discount factor among interior cooperators (those
for whom pi < 1) exceeds the aforementioned threshold. The second condition is a “risk-
dominance-like” property on the stage game. The condition requires that in any bilateral
relationship, the relative loss from cooperating against an uncooperative member is smaller
than the relative gain to deviating against a cooperative one.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Because a player’s cooperation likelihood in
equilibrium depends on the distribution of discount factors of others, seemingly neutral
changes in scale are not neutral from a particular player’s point of view. Take for example
a 2-person group with a patient and an impatient player. If this group is replicated once,
doubling in size, then the patient player faces one other patient player and two impatient
players. Whereas before, he faced one impatient player. Hence the proportion of patient
to impatient players has changed favorably for the patient player. This explains why the
marginal response to a change in scale is positive above a ﬁxed threshold discount factor and
is negative below it. What is crucial is that this marginal response is convex in the discount
factor. The convexity creates an asymmetry between patient and impatient players in their
responses to increases in group size. Impatience has a dampening eﬀect: an impatient
player cares less about the future responses of others to his current action. Consequently,
the positive response of the patient player to an increase in scale exceeds the negative
response of the impatient one.
Signiﬁcantly, returns to scale critically requires heterogeneity. The assumptions do not
hold, and the result fails when discounting is homogeneous. When players’ time preferences
are the same, the MAC likelihood is invariant to group size.
Section 6 summarizes these ﬁndings and discusses limitations and possibilities for future
work. Section 7 is an Appendix which contains all the proofs of the results. Most of these
are computation-intensive but are otherwise straightforward. The results demonstrate, in
limited form, that both group size and its composition matters. Moreover, it matters in a
way quite diﬀerent than is supposed by the standard logic. In a heterogeneous group, in-
tertemporal incentives for good behavior sometimes improve with size, but generally worsen
with more group diversity.
4The literature comparing the size of a group with the degree of cooperation in static
collective action games is vast. See Sandler (1992) or Marwell and Oliver (1993) for surveys.
In particular, there are studies which ﬁnd a reversal of Olson’s conjecture that cooperation
is more diﬃcult in larger groups. These include include Esteban and Ray (2001), McGuire
(1974), and Chamberlin (1974). They show that an increase in group size may increase
the total provision of the public good, even though individual contributions may fall. Our
model, however, shows something stronger. Namely, an increase in group size may lead
to increase in the average contribution. Moreover, it is the repeated game nature of the
problem, coupled with heterogeneous discounting, which makes this so.
Surprisingly, there are few studies of repeated games with heterogeneous discounting.
One seminal exception is the aforementioned work by Lehrer and Pauzner (LP) (1999).
They examine two-player repeated games with diﬀerential discount factors. Their main
results characterize the feasible payoﬀs, and the equilibrium payoﬀs in the “heterogeneous
limit," meaning that ﬁxed diﬀerences between the two discount factors are maintained while
discounting approaches one.6 Heterogeneous limits in discounting also appear in a number
of other repeated game studies. Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) prove a Folk Theorem
for a subset of the players when the other players’ discount factors are 0. Harrington (1989)
characterizes the bounds on heterogeneous discount factors required to achieve collusion in
oligopolies. Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Celantani, et al. (1995), and Aoyagi (1996) all
examine reputation-building by a suﬃciently patient, long run player who faces a sequence
of short run players in a repeated game. Finally, a similar approach to the present paper
was taken in Haag and Lagunoﬀ (2001), which examined stationary trigger strategies in a
local interaction network.
2A n E x a m p l e w i t h T w o G r o u p M e m b e r s
To see how the MAC likelihood is determined, we begin with the quintessential collective
action problem of Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the game below, a player’s level of cooperation,
pi,i saprobability of cooperation, and the payoﬀs are mixed extensions to a ﬁnite action
game. The game matrix is given in Figure 1 below.
CD
C c,c - ,d
D d,-  0,0
Figure 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
6Speciﬁcally, a player’s discount factor in the LP model is δ
∆t where ∆ is the time length of a period.
LP examine equilibrium payoﬀsw h e n∆ is close enough to zero while maintaining a ﬁxed log ratio
log(δ1)
log(δ2)
between the two discount factors.
5As is typical of PD games, each individual can choose a cooperative action, C,o ra n
uncooperative one, D, each period. For Prisoner’s Dilemma we require that d>c>0 > − ,
and 2c>d−  . For ease of exposition, we also assume in this Section that d>c+  .7
When the PD game is inﬁnitely repeated, it is a standard exercise to show that the
proﬁle (C,C) can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if both individuals are
suﬃciently patient. How well can they do if one or both discount factors falls below the
“patience threshold?”
Let δi denote the discount factor of individual i =1 ,2. Each individual uses δi to
calculate his average discounted sum of payoﬀs. Let pi denote the probability that Player
i chooses to cooperate in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which mixed
action histories are observable by both members.8 The pair (p1,p 2) constitutes an SSPE if
for each i =1 ,2,a n dj 6= i,
pi(pjc − (1 − pj) )+( 1− pi)pjd ≥ (1 − δi)pjd (3)
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 3 )i sP l a y e ri’s average payoﬀ under the stationary action proﬁle
(p1,p 2). The right hand side is the one shot gain from a deviation to the uncooperative
action with the consequence that both members permanently revert thereafter to the one
shot Nash equilibrium, (D,D).
Inequality (3) yields this system of inequalities
δ1p2 ≥ p1(p2µ +( 1− p2)γ)
δ2p1 ≥ p2(p1µ +( 1− p1)γ)
(4)
where µ ≡ (d − c)/d and γ ≡  /d.9 The ﬁrst inequality is Player 1’s incentive constraint
against deviating to D. The second inequality is the identical incentive constraint for
Player 2. Clearly, full cooperation, i.e., (p1,p 2)=( 1 ,1) solves this system whenever δi ≥
µ ≡ (d − c)/d for both i =1 ,2. In this case the Folk Theorem property applies.
However, when δi <µfor either or both players, one can still sensibly ask: how "well"
these two can do on average in any SSPE? The maximal average cooperation (MAC) likeli-
hood, deﬁned by the maximal value of 1
2(p1 + p2) over all SSPE pairs (p1,p 2),p r o v i d e so n e
answer. This value, which we denote by p∗, is the highest likelihood that a randomly chosen
individual from this pair is cooperative in equilibrium.
Any candidate pair (p1,p 2) for determining a MAC likelihood must fall into one of four
categories. (i) only Player 1’s incentive constraint binds; (ii) only Player 2’s constraint
7Roughly, this condition is needed to ensure that symmetric mixed equilibria may be optimal when
players are impatient.
8As we observed earlier, the assumption of observed mixed actions is restrictive, and so this example is
intended for illustrative purposes. In the general model, we examine the case of continuous pure actions
rather than the mixed extensions.
9Note that by our earlier assumptions, µ>γsince d>c+  .
6binds; (iii) both bind; or (iv) neither bind. Notice also that if a constraint does not bind,
then for that player i,i tm u s tb et h a tpi =1since otherwise, his coooperation probability
can be increased without violating the incentive constraint of the other player. Solving the
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2 ≤ δ1δ2 <µ γ+m i n {δ1,δ2}(µ − γ)
0 if δ1δ2 <γ 2
(5)
In expression (5), the MAC likelihood takes on distinct values in each of ﬁve regions in
discount factor space. These regions are exhibited in Figure 2. For example, the conditions






are those in which Player 2’s constraint does
not bind, and Player 1’s does bind. In this case, Player 2 cooperates with certainty, while
Player 1 “partially cooperates,” choosing C with probability less than one. Solving for
Player 1’s binding constraint when p2 =1gives p1 = δ1/µ ≡ δ1/d−c
d . Hence, a player who
discounts to 20% of the full cooperation threshold µ is uncooperative 20% of the time.
It is clear from (5) that p∗ is (weakly) increasing and continuous in the pair (δ1,δ2).
It is also straightforward to show that the MAC likelihood is generally decreasing in mean
preserving spreads of the original pair (δ1,δ2). This means that the larger is the diﬀerence
in the two players’ time preferences, other things equal, the less cooperative is the group on
average.





      
      
1 if ¯ δ ≥ µ
¯ δ−γ
µ−γ if γ ≥ ¯ δ<µ
0 if ¯ δ<γ
(6)
Many interesting questions pertain to group size. To answer these, the n-group model is





Player 2  
Full 
Player 1 Full 
Player 2 Partial  Partial 
Cooperation 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Cooperation Across Proﬁles of Discount Factors
a system of inequalities that do not bind at the boundaries of [0,1]2 –i si m p r a c t i c a lw i t h
n>2 players. The good news is that one need not solve the system to obtain the MAC
likelihood. Since only knowledge of the aggregate level of cooperation is required, the MAC
likelihood can be characterized by a single, continuous, piecewise-smooth function.
3 A Model of Group Cooperation
3.1 The n-Group
A collection of n individuals play an inﬁnitely repeated game in discrete time t =0 ,1,....
We refer to this collection as the “n-group” or, more simply, “the group.” In each period,
the stage game is as follows. Each member i of the n-group chooses a number, pi,f r o mas e t
[0,1] of feasible actions. The action pi determines member i’s chosen level of cooperation
toward the group. An action proﬁle is given by p =( p1,...p n).
Each individual’s payoﬀ is assumed to increase in the aggregate level of cooperation of
other members of the group, but assumed to decrease in his own level of cooperation in
the aggregate. If an individual is highly cooperative while other group members are highly
8uncooperative, the individual incurs a loss. In order to maintain constant returns in the
static incentives for cooperation (so as not to bias the results on size later on), we assume




[pi (pjc +( 1− pj)(− )) + (1 − pi)pjd] (7)
where c is the reward to mutual cooperation, d is the reward to (unilaterally) uncooperative
behavior, and   is the loss incurred from others’ uncooperative behavior. We assume that
d>c>0 > − ,a n d2c>d− >0 (as with Prisoner’s Dilemma game). It is easy to check
that p =( 0 ,...,0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
This payoﬀ structure deserves comment. Observe, ﬁrst, that actions are undirected, i.e,
an individual cannot choose diﬀerent actions toward each of the other n−1 group members.
If payoﬀs were separable across directed levels of cooperation for each other member of the
group, then each bilateral interaction would be a separate strategic problem, and so the
results from the previous Section would suﬃce.
Second, to isolate the eﬀect of intertemporal incentives, the stage payoﬀs should reﬂect
a “size neutral" collective action problem. Otherwize, the stage payoﬀs may bias incentives
toward either larger or smaller groups. The “size neutrality" requirement entails that pay-
oﬀs be linear in one’s own action. The collective action (free rider) problem entails that
payoﬀs are increasing in the aggregate cooperation of others, and decreasing in one’s own
cooperation. Finally, the payoﬀs allow for nonzero cross derivatives between own and other’s
actions (e.g., the payoﬀ structrure admits games of strategic substitutes). One can verify
that the payoﬀ in (7) therefore belongs to a "canonical class" deﬁned by
πi =[ A − pi]F(
X
j6=i
pj) − Bpi + C (8)
where A,B,C > 0,a n dF is increasing in
P
j6=i
pj. The payoﬀ in (7) is a normalization of the
case in which F is linear.
Third, the particular normalization used in (7) has a convenient interpretation. Payoﬀs
and actions have been normalized so that the proﬁle p can be interpreted as a proﬁle of mixed
strategies in a "generalized version" of Prisoner’s Dilemma for n players. To see this, suppose
that there are two discrete actions, a “cooperative” action, C, and an “uncooperative” one,
D.L e tai ∈ {C,D},a n dl e ta =( a1,...,a n) denote the pure action proﬁle. If n =2 ,s ot h a t
there are only two members in the group, then the payoﬀs are described by the (standard)
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in Figure 1. If n ≥ 2, the pure strategy stage payoﬀs to a group





(q − 1)c − (n − q) i fa i = C
qd if ai = D
where q = |{j =1 ,...,n : aj = C}| describes the number of individuals that choose C.
Hence, i’s payoﬀ m a yb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h es u mo ft h ep a y o ﬀs from each bilateral interaction
from all other members of the group. Then the payoﬀ in (7) corresponds to each player’s
expected payoﬀ when each member i =1 ,...,nchooses C with probability pi.
Because this mixed action interpretion of p requires that we assume mixed action his-
tories are observable, the alternative interpretation in which pi is the continuous level of
some cooperative eﬀort in a team problem, is probably more desirable. Nevertheless, we
will occasionally ﬁnd it more convenient to use the mixed action interpretation.







where δi denote the discount factor of member i.L e tδ =( δ1,...,δ n) denote the (arbitrary)
proﬁle of discount factors of the group.
3.2 Maximal Average Cooperation
We assume that the histories (p(1),...,p(t)) are publically observable and restrict attention
to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). These are subgame perfect equilibria in
which the same vector of actions are chosen each period. For now, we leave the discussion
and implications of this restriction to Section 5. Because histories are publically obesrved,
any SSPE path in this class of games can be implemented by an SSPE which uses simple
“trigger strategies” in which any deviation is met with permanent reversion to the one shot,
“uncooperative” equilibrium. Hence, there is no confusion when we refer to the stationary
path proﬁle, p,a sastationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE).10









10The argument for why there is no loss of generality is standard: since the minmax payoﬀ is 0, any
equilibrium path remains an equilibrium path if it is enforced by the threat of permanent reversion to the
one-shot equilibrium in which everyone in the group chooses “D” thereafter.
10The optimal value of (9) is an action p∗ ∈ [0,1] that describes the maximal average coop-
eration (MAC) likelihood. In Section 4, the MAC likelihood will be denoted by p∗(n,δ) to
mark the explicit dependence on group’s size, n, and characteristics, δ.
3.3 Characterizing the MAC Likelihood
Fix a type proﬁle δ and a stationary path, p(t)=p, ∀t. Using (7), proﬁle p describes a

















The right hand side of (10) is the payoﬀ from deviating and behaving uncooperatively.
Since the punishment is permanent “uncooperative” behavior by all members, the deviant
gains only in the initial period.
One can easily verify that if all other members cooperate fully, i.e., pj =1for all j 6= i,
then member i should cooperate fully if
δi ≥ (d − c)/d. (11)
If (11) holds for all members of the group (which is the case examined by the Folk Theorem),
then the problem of optimal cooperation is trivial (the MAC likelihood is 1). Consequently,
the problem of optimal cooperation becomes interesting precisely when suﬃciently conﬂict-
ing time preferences exist.

















Now let µ = d−c
d and γ =  
d (as in the previous Section). Parameter µ is the relative
gain to choosing the uncooperative action against a cooperative opponent. γ is the relative
loss (against payoﬀ d) if one is cooperative against an uncooperative opponent. Using these










The following Lemma asserts that in any equilibrium that achieves the MAC likelihood,
the slackness in (12) must come from the boundary condition pi =1 . Another way of saying
this is that the second Inequality, (13), must hold with equality.
11Lemma 1 Let p denote a mixed action proﬁle which describes a stationary, subgame perfect
equilibrium (SSPE) path. Suppose that p∗ = 1
n
Pn
i=1 pi,w h e r ep∗ is the maximal average
cooperation (MAC) likelihood. Then p satisﬁes (13) with equality for each individual i.
The proof of this and all other results are in the Appendix. Rewriting Equation (12)
with parameters µ = d−c
d and γ =  
d we obtain
pi[(µ − γ)P−i + γ(n − 1)] ≤ δiP−i (14)
Let P =
Pn
i=1 pi denote the aggregate likelihood of cooperation. Then add and subtract
piδi to right hand side of (12) and add and subtract p2
i [µ − γ] to the left hand side of (12),
to obtain the quadratic inequality
Qi(pi) ≡ (µ − γ)p
2
i − (P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)pi + Pδi ≥ 0 (15)
The graph of the quadratic Qi takes on one of two forms depending on whether µ<γ
or µ>γ . Figure 3 exhibits each of the two cases, respectively.
The following Lemma establishes necessary conditions for an equilibrium proﬁle to yield
a positive MAC likelihood. It requires from each individual either full cooperation (pi =1 ),
or partial cooperation as determined by one of the roots of the quadratic expression in (15).
Lemma 2 Let p denote an SSPE such that p∗ = 1
n
P
i pi is the MAC likelihood, and P∗ =





Ri(P ∗) if δi <µ + γ n−P∗
P∗−1 or if P ∗ < 1
1 if otherwise
where Ri(P∗) is one of the two real roots of the quadratic function Qi in Expression (15)
and is given by
Ri(P
∗)=
P ∗(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi −
p
(P∗(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)2 − 4(µ − γ)P ∗δi
2(µ − γ)
When µ<γ ,t h e nRi(P) is the larger root of the quadratic in (15), and so from the
ﬁrst graph in Figure 3 it is clear that the maximal possible cooperation for i occurs either










Figure 3: Quadratic Function Qi(pi) for cases µ<γand µ>γ , respectively.
13quadratic, and so from the second graph, the maximal cooperation once again occurs when
either pi =1or pi = Ri(P).





Ri(P) if δi <µ + γ n−P
P−1 or if P<1
1 if otherwise
(16)
For each member i, ψi is the response likelihood to aggregate cooperation P. Finally, let






Using the Lemmatta, our ﬁrst result provides a fairly simple characterization of the
MAC likelihood in terms of aggregate or average behavior.
Theorem 1 The MAC likelihood is given by
p




∈ [0,1] : P = Ψ(P)
¾
(18)
where the solution to (18) is nonempty.




γ(n − 1) + δi
> 1 (19)
According the result, the MAC likelihood is the largest ﬁxed point of Ψ divided by n.
The Proof in the Appendix shows , in fact, that Ψ h a sa tm o s tt w oﬁxed points, one of
which, P =0 , always exists. The other is an interior ﬁxed point, P>0,w h i c he x i s t s
whenever (19) holds.
While the ﬁxed point characterization is somewhat reminiscent of standard ﬁxed point
logic for static games, the derivations are obviously diﬀerent. Rather than coming from a
best response correspondence, Ψ is an aggregate equilibrium likelihood response along the
equilibrium path of the repeated game.
144 Composition Eﬀects
The Characterization Result (Theorem 1) will prove useful because it is easier to evaluate
parametric changes in the ﬁxed point mapping Ψ, than to evaluate these changes in the
MAC likelihood directly. For example, if Ψ is increasing in δ, then it follows that the MAC
likelihood is increasing in δ. The former is much easier to establish than the latter directly.






i) denote two distinct proﬁles of discount factors,
and let p∗(n,δ
0) and p∗(n,δ






00 is a mean preserving spread of δ





























0), with strict inequality if 0 <p ∗(n,δ
0) < 1.
The Proof shows that for each i, ψi is increasing and concave in δi. This establishes the
ﬁrst part. The second part then follows from a standard, second order stochastic dominance
argument. Note that one cannot generally infer strict inequality between the two likelihoods
since δ
00 may already place all individuals in the region of full cooperation (i.e., pi =1 , ∀i),
and so further increases in δ have no eﬀect.
The fact that average cooperation “increases" in each member’s patience is, of course,
to be expected. However, the second part is less obvious. Increased heterogeneity increases
the degree of social conﬂict. A group responds poorly to increased variability of time
preferences among its members. The intuition, roughly, is that more patient individuals
are less responsive to increases in patience than impatient ones. The eﬀect of increasing a
player’s discount factor is to increase the weight on future punishment following a deviation.
For an already patient player, the eﬀect of additional deterrence is small relative to that on
an impatient individual.
5S i z e E ﬀects
The issue of scale of cooperation is more complicated. A corporate merger, for example,
requires the merger of two groups of workers, each of a diﬀerent size and each with diﬀerent
15characteristics. It is certainly possible for the merger to increase both the size and the social
variability relative to each group. Hence, to isolate the eﬀect of size alone, we consider the
eﬀect of increasing n while ﬁxing the distribution on δ. The simplest construction replicates
the group α times, for some positive integer α.
A useful benchmark is the special case where discounting is homogeneous. In that
case, Lemma 1 and (13) imply that SSPE proﬁles that determine the MAC likelihood are
symmetric. Hence, the incentive constraint in (10) reduces to
pi((n − 1)pc +( n − 1)(1 − p)(− )) + (1 − pi)(n − 1)pd ≥ (1 − ¯ δ)(n − 1)pd (20)
where p is the symmetric probability that each of the other members cooperates, while ¯ δ is
the uniform discount factor. Obviously, the constraint is invariant to n. Hence, the MAC
likelihood is also invariant to n, and is described by (6).
I tw i l lp r o v em o r eh e l p f u li ft h es c a l ef a c t o rα is treated as a continuous, rather than
a discrete, variable. First, we write an individual’s response likelihood as ψ(P,n,δi) to
explicitly express the dependence on group size and on discount factor. Then, a group







n) is the maximal aggregate cooperation in the n-group. If this partial
derivative is positive (negative), then member i increases (decreases) his contribution if both
group size and its aggregate contribution is scaled up by α<1.
Theorem 3 Let p be a SSPE such that 1
n
P
i pi = p∗(n,δ). Then, for any scale factor





      
      
> 0 if δi >p ∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
=0 if δi = p∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
< 0 if δi <p ∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
(21)
I nw o r d s ,t h es i g no fam e m b e ri’s marginal response to scale α depends on whether or
not his discount factor lies above the threshold p∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ. Since the scale
factor α does not appear in (21), an individual’s marginal response to scale is positive or
negative independent of the change in scale. Of course, the magnitude of one’s marginal
16response does depend on the magnitude of the change in scale. Hence, if every member of an
n-group is above the threshold (21), then the aggregate response to a change in group size
is positive. Similarly, if no group member is above the threshold (21), then the aggregate
response is negative.
Figure 4 below displays two individual marginal responses to scale, each graphed as a
function of δi.T h e ﬁrst graph corresponds to a scale factor α =2while in the second,
α =1 0 . Parameter values are n =8 0 ,P =3 0 ,µ=( d−c)/d = .6, and γ =  /d = .5.N o t i c e
that each of the graphs cross the δi axis at p∗(n,δ)µ+[1−p∗(n,δ)] γ =( 3 0 /80).6+(50/80).5=
.5375.










Marginal Response to Scale for α =2









Marginal Response to scale for α =1 0
Figure 4




αn) > (<) p
∗(n,δ
n) (22)
Inequality (22) can be expressed equivalently as P∗
αn > (<) αP∗
n. Hence, increasing
(decreasing) returns to cooperation exist if maximal aggregate cooperation is superadditive
(subadditive).
An obvious corollary to the previous Theorem is:
Corollary Suppose 0 <p ∗(n,δ) < 1. Then the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing (decreas-
ing) returns at every scale factor α>1 if for every member i =1 ,...,n,
δi > (<) p
∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p
∗(n,δ)] γ (23)
17The result would still hold if the hypothesis of the Corollary was weakened so that (23)
held only for all "interior cooperators," i.e., all those for whom 0 <p i < 1.E v e n s o ,
the requirement that individuals’ discount factors all lie above (or below) some threshold
is quite strong. It turns out that a natural asymmetry exists between the increasing an
decreasing returns cases. To show increasing returns, one need only compare the average
discount factor with the threshold.
Theorem 4 Fix an n-group with MAC likelihood 0 <p ∗(n,δ) < 1.O r d e r t h e d i s c o u n t
factors in ascending order:
δ1 <δ 2 < ···<δ n
and let i∗ be the largest index i for which ψ(P ∗
n,n,δi) < 1 (i.e., the response likelihood of
each member i =1 ,...,i ∗ is less than one).
Then, if n






∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p
∗(n,δ)] γ, (24)
then the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing returns to scale at every scale factor α>1.
According the Theorem, the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing returns to scale if both
Inequality (24) and the inequalities n
(n−1)2 <γ<µhold. The latter inequalities hold, in
turn, if the initial group is large enough and if a "risk-dominance-like" condition holds.
This "risk-dominance-like" condition, µ>γ ,i se q u i v a l e n tt oc +  <din the stage game.
In words, it entails that in each bilateral interaction, the relative loss from cooperating
against an uncooperative member is smaller than the relative gain to deviating against a
cooperative one. As for (24), the left hand side of (24) is the average discount factor among
those who do not cooperate fully. The right hand side is the same threshold condition as
in (21) which determines whether an individual’s marginal response to scale is positive or
negative. Hence, (24) requires that the conditional average discount factor of the group is
above this threshold.
Signiﬁcantly, the Inequality (24) fails when discount factors are identical. In that case,
the MAC likelihood, recall, is given by (6) which is invariant to size. One can check in that
case that the left and right hand sides in (24) are equal, and so the marginal response to scale
of every member is zero. Figure 5 exhibits returns to scale in the 2-member group. Constant
returns occur in the "full cooperation" region and along the 45 degree line where discount
factors are identical. Increasing returns occur where (24) holds. Decreasing returns occur
where the threshold condition for both individuals fail or where it fails for one individual
and the other is no longer an "interior" cooperator.
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Figure 5: Returns to Scale in the 2-Member Group
The proof combines the previous Theorem 3 with a convexity argument. Roughly, we
prove that an individual’s marginal response to scale is convex as in Figure 4. A simple
Jensen’s Inequality argument establishes that if the conditional average discount factor
exceeds the threshold p∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ then the group’s marginal response to a
change in scale is positive. Hence, the MAC likelihood exhibits returns to scale.
To get a better idea for why result applies only to increasing returns, consider two
individuals, with discount factors δH,δL, respectively, with δH >δ L. The high or patient
type has a discount factor above the threshold: δH >p ∗(n,δ)µ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ.T h e
impatient type lies below it. From (13) and Lemma 1, we know that an individual’s response
is









if proﬁle p yields the MAC likelihood. Clearly, pi increases in one’s own discount factor,
and decreases in one’s “cooperation ratio” (n− 1 − P−i)/P−i, the ratio of uncooperative to
cooperative behavior of others. In this two person case, the patient player faces a “cooper-
ation ratio” of (1 − pL)/pL while the impatient player faces (1 − pH)/pH.I nt h i se x a m p l e ,
these ratios do not change if each player faces more players of the same opposing type.
For example, if the patient player faced two impatient players, then his cooperation ratio,
hence his equilibrium response, would not change. Generally, only relative, not absolute,
19cooperation matters to each player.
However, if the group size, say, doubles, then the patient individual faces another patient
type as well as two impatient types. The patient player therefore faces a change in the
distribution of types. If all others’ responses are scaled accordingly, then the patient player’s
cooperation ratio is (3−2pL−pH)/(2pL+pH) which is smaller than before. The patient player
therefore responds positively. On the other hand, for the impatient player, his cooperation
ratio increases, thereby decreasing his equilibrium response. Returns to scale exist if the
positive response of the patient player exceeds the negative response of the impatient one.
Indeed, it turns out that an impatient player’s marginal response to a change in scale is
ﬂatter than that of the patient player. The reason is simple. The incentive constraints
measure current gains to deviating against future losses from punishment in the equilibrium
continuation. The cooperation ratio (n− 1 −P−i)/P−i is used to determine each member’s
discounted average payoﬀ in equilibrium. An impatient player is less responsive to changes
in this ratio because he is less responsive to the changes in the resulting equilibrium path.
Hence, although his cooperation ratio is inferior when the group size doubles, his response
(as reﬂected in (25) ) is ultimately dampened by his impatience.
6 Summary and Discussion
This papers studies cooperative behavior in a class of repeated, collective action games in
which the stage game incentives are "size-neutral." We deﬁne and characterize the MAC
likelihood which describes the maximal average level of cooperation of a group in a stationary
equilibrium.
The focus on stationary equilibria has costs and beneﬁts. On the cost side, the MAC
likelihood may understate the success of the group. Lehrer and Pauzner show that non-
stationary equilibria could conceivably give the group members higher payoﬀst h a nt h e
stationary ones generated by maximal average cooperation. This is largely due to the fact
that the feasible payoﬀss e t sa r ed i ﬀerent than that of the stage game. Improvements in the
feasible set can result when time-heterogeneous individuals intertemporally “trade" payoﬀs.
The beneﬁts to stationarity vary. One is the obvious tractability for the group members.
Stationary equilibria facilitates objective measurement of the group by an outside observer.
This is especially relevant if the group is externally compensated. Nonstationary equilibria
present problems for measurement since it is unclear how cooperation early in the game
should be weighted against cooperation later if there is no common discount factor. A
second beneﬁt to stationarity is that it allows for comparisons across groups of diﬀering
composition. Stationary equilibria allow the members (and the outside observer) to isolate
the eﬀect of equilibrium (as opposed to feasible) behavior because the feasible payoﬀ set
remains constant across all proﬁles δ.
20With these caveats, the MAC likelihood reveals some unexpected properties of group
cooperation in repeated games. In particular it exposes the way in which cooperation
depends on the size and structure of the group. More homogeneous groups are, ceteris
parabis, shown to be more cooperative, and under certain conditions, larger groups are
more cooperative as well.
The results do not, of course, imply that social planners should construct purely homo-
geneous groups. Nor should they attempt to build groups of arbitrarily large size. Returns
to homogeneity may be balanced by beneﬁts to diversity along other dimensions. Returns
to size may be balanced by increasing costs of retaining individuals in larger groups. More-
over, the assumption of perfect monitoring in the model is probably harder to justify with
larger groups. Depending on the game, imperfect monitoring may bound the group away
from the Pareto frontier. Finally, it may not be possible to keep constant the distribution
of types when adding to the group. Our results say little about how mergers of distinctly
diﬀerent groups perform.
Interest in group performance in collective action problems date back at least to Olson
(1965). We oﬀer one possible antitode to a commonly expressed view that larger groups
are less eﬀective at resolving free rider problems. If this view is correct, then at least the
results help to clarify, by process of elimination, why this should be so.
The paper is best viewed as provisional. Presumably, the MAC likelihood is well deﬁned
in stage games for which a natural ordering exists for all players’ action sets from the less
to more “cooperative” actions. Whether the results extend more broadly in this class of
g a m e sr e m a i n sa no p e nq u e s t i o n .
7 Appendix










for each i =1 ,...,n.N o wﬁxap r o ﬁle p according to the hypothesis. Then
p ≤ f(p)
Suppose that (13) holds with slack for individual i =1 .T h e n p1 <f 1(p−1).W e n o w
construct an alternative SSPE, p0, i.e., a proﬁle satisfying p0 ≤ f(p0),a n ds u c ht h a tp0
i ≥ pi
for all i and p0
1 >p 1.F i r s t t a k e  >0 suﬃciently small such that p0
1 = p1 +  <f 1(p−1).
Then let p0



















which contradicts the assertion that p achieves the MAC likelihood. ♦
Proof of Lemma 2 Fix any P>0.L e tA = µ−γ, B = −[P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi] and
C = Pδi > 0.T h eq u a d r a t i ci npi has the form,
Ap
2
i + Bpi + C ≥ 0 (27)
We ﬁrst show that the roots of (27) are real. The discriminant of the root in (27) is √
B2 − 4AC where
B
2 − 4AC =( −[P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi])
2 − 4(µ − γ)Pδi
Case 1: µ<γ
µ<γ⇒ (µ − γ) < 0 ⇒− 4(µ − γ)Pδi > 0.S i n c e B2 ≥ 0 for all B,w eh a v et h a t
B2 − 4AC > 0 and so the roots are real.
Case 2: µ>γ
B2 − 4AC =( −[P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi])
2 − 4(µ − γ)Pδi
= P2(µ − γ)2 + γ2(n − 1)2 + δ
2
i +2 P(µ − γ)γ(n − 1) + 2P(µ − γ)δi +2 γ(n −




=( P(µ − γ) − δi)
2+γ2(n−1)2+2P(µ−γ)γ(n−1)+2γ(n−1)δi > 0. Therefore,
the roots are real.
Now deﬁne Q(pi)=Ap2
i +Bpi+C as the quadratic in Equation (27). By the assumption
that p∗ > 0, it follows that P>0,a n ds oC>0.T h e nQ(0) = C>0.T ob e g i n ,l e tP ≥ 1
and consider the following two cases: (a) µ>γand (b) µ<γ .11
Case (a): in case (a),w eh a v eA>0 and B<0. Q0(p)=2 Api + B and therefore
Q0(0) < 0.S i n c eA>0 and from Proposition (1), we have two positive real roots.











. We do not focus on this case, since it occurs only when c = d −  .
22By the previous Lemma, pi must be the maximum value in [0,1] consistent with Q(pi) ≥
0.T h a ti s ,
pi =m a x {p
0
i ∈ [0,1] : Q(p
0
i) ≥ 0}
Then pi < 1 is a solution iﬀ the lower root of Q is less than 1 while the greater root of Q is











Since A>0,w ec a nw r i t et h i sa s :
−B −
√





B2 − 4AC < 2A + B<
√
B2 − 4AC
⇔ |2A + B| <
√
B2 − 4AC
⇔ (2A + B)2 <B 2 − 4AC
⇔ 4A2 +4 AB + B2 <B 2 − 4AC
⇔ 4A2 +4 AB < −4AC
⇔ A + B + C<0
⇔ (µ − γ) − (P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)+Pδi < 0
⇔ δi <µ− γ + γ n−1
P−1
⇔ δi < d−c
d +  
d
n−P
¯ P−1 Hence, pi = Ri(P) whenever δi < d−c
d +  
d
n−P
P−1. This concludes Case
(a).
Case (b): in case (b),w eh a v et h a tµ<γ ,s oA<0.S i n c eQ(0) > 0 and from the ﬁrst
part of the Proof, we must have one negative real root and one positive real root. In that
case, pi < 1 is a solution to
max{p
0
i ∈ [0,1] : Q(p
0
i) ≥ 0}










23Since A<0,w ec a nw r i t et h i sa s :
−B −
√
B2 − 4AC > 2A
⇔−
√
B2 − 4AC > 2A + B
⇔
√
B2 − 4AC < −(2A + B)
⇔ B2 − 4AC < 4A2 +4 AB + B2
⇔ 4A2 +4 AB +4 AC < 0
⇔ A + B + C<0 (since A<0)
⇔ δi < d−c
d +  
d
n−P
P−1. Hence, as with Case (a), pi = Ri(P) whenever δi < d−c




This concludes Case (b).
Finally, we note that when P<1, the constraint that binds is no longer that pi ≤ 1,
but rather that pi ≤ P. ♦
Proof of Theorem 1 T h ep r o o fp r o c e e d si nt h r e es t e p s . F i r s t ,w es h o wt h a tΨ is










γ(n−1)+δi > 1 holds.
(i) Show that Ψ is increasing. Observe, ﬁrst, that µ + γ n−P
P−1 is decreasing in P.G i v e n
(16), this means that the cutoﬀ value above which ψi =1is decreasing. Given (16) and








P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi −
p













Now observe that A does not vary with P,a n d
∂(−B/2A)
∂P =1 /2. Hence, it suﬃces to show
∂(B2−4AC)1/2(2A)−1































But substituting for A,B and C gives
(P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)δi >P(µ − γ)δi
which is easily conﬁrmed to hold. Hence, (30) holds and so ∂Ψ/∂P ≥ 0.
(ii) Show that Ψ is concave. It suﬃces to show that ∂2R
∂P2 < 0. Given (29) and the fact
that ∂2B








) > 0 (31)
Utilizing the fact that ∂B
∂P = −A and ∂2C
∂P2 =0 , (31) holds iﬀ
(B
















Substituting for A,B,a n dC, yields
−(µ − γ)Pδi > −(P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)δi + δ
2
i
which, ﬁnally, simpliﬁes to γ(n − 1) > 0.S i n c e γ =  /d > 0, this condition must hold.
Hence, Ψ is concave.





> 1 under the stated hypothesis. Observe that a necessary










25since the derivatives are evaluated in a neighborhood of 0 where the value of each ψi coincides






=1 /2 − 1/2[
γ(n − 1) − δi












γ(n − 1) − δi








γ(n − 1) + δi
> 1
which was assumed in the hypothesis. Since Ψ is increasing, concave, and diﬀerentiates
above 1 in a neighborhood of 0, it must have a unique, interior ﬁxed point. ♦
Proof of Theorem 2 Write Ψ(P,n,δ) to express the explicit dependence on size n and
structure, δ. By standard results for second order stochastic dominance, it suﬃces to show
that for each i, ψi is increasing and concave in δi and strictly concave if δ
0
j <µ+ γ n−P
P−1.
To show ψi is increasing, we use the previous construction in (28). Then ∂R









Substituting for A,B,a n dC gives
−Pδi > −P(P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)+P
2(µ − γ)
or γ(n − 1) > 0 which always holds. Hence, Ψ is increasing in δi.
To show Ψ is concave, observe that ∂2R
∂δ2









which is exactly the condition determining monotonicity for ψi. Just as before, Substituting
for A,B,a n dC gives
−Pδi > −P(P(µ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)+P
2(µ − γ)
or γ(n−1) > 0 which always holds. Therefore, ψi is strictly concave if δi <µ+γ n−P
P−1.B u t
if p∗(n,δ
0) < 1, it follows from Lemma 2 that for at least one individual i, δi <µ+ γ n−P
P−1
where P = np∗(n,δ
0). In this instance, Ψ is strictly concave, and so p∗(n,δ
00) <p ∗(n,δ
0).
26We conclude that mean preserving spreads of δ decrease the MAC likelihood, and strictly
decrease in whenever p∗(n,δ
0) < 1. ♦
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 From the Proof of Lemma 2, ψ(αP ∗












n µ +( 1−
P∗
n
n )γ. Hence, it is without loss of generality if






















where R(·) is the quadratic root deﬁned in (2) in Lemma 2.




αP(µ − γ)+γ(αn − 1) + δi −
p



























































27which is the requisite threshold condition whenever P satisﬁes P
n = p∗(n,δ). ♦







0, ∀α>1. In other words, the marginal response
∂ψ
∂α
is convex in δi. Then, using Jensen’s
inequality, we can show that if the conditional average of discount factors is above the
threshold given, there are returns to scale.
Using Young’s Theorem, we can ﬁrst take the partial derivatives with respect to δi and








































− (B2 − 4AC)−1
2
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− (B2 − 4AC)
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Substituting in for A = µ − γ,B = −(αP(µ − γ)+αγn + δi − γ),B= αPδi and
∂B
∂α = −(P(µ − γ)+γn), ∂C
∂δi = αP, ∂C
∂δ∂α = P, ∂C
∂α = Pδi and rearranging terms yields:
α2(αn − 2)(P(µ − γ)+γn)
2 + α(αn +1 )( γ(P(µ − γ)+γn)+P(µ − γ)δi)
>α (αn +1 ) γnδi +( 2 αn − 1)(δi − γ)2
Squaring the ﬁrst term and noting that (δi − γ)2 <γ 2 yields:
α2(αn−2)(P2(µ − γ)2 +2 P(µ − γ)γn+ γ2n2)+α(αn+1)(γP(µ − γ)+γ2n + P(µ − γ)δi)
>α (αn +1 ) γnδi +( 2 αn − 1)γ2
Since µ>γ , we can rearrange terms as:
α2(αn − 2)(P 2(µ − γ)2 +2 P(µ − γ)γn)+α(αn +1 )( γP(µ − γ)+P(µ − γ)δi)
+α2(αn − 2)n2γ2 + α(αn +1 ) γ2n − (2αn − 1)γ2
>α (αn +1 ) γnδi
or
[α2(αn − 2)n2 + α(αn +1 ) n − (2αn − 1)]γ2 >α (αn +1 ) γnδi
Dividing by γ and multiplying out the bracketed term yields:
[α3n3 − 2α2n2 + α2n2 + αn − 2αn +1 ]γ>α n (αn +1 ) δi
29Factoring yields:
(αn +1 ) ( αn − 1)2γ>α n (αn +1 ) δi




The derivative with the right-hand side with respect to α is negative for α ≥ 1,t h u sw e
can take as a suﬃcient condition that α =1and thus
∂ψ
∂α
is convex if γ>
n
(n − 1)2.














































The ﬁrst inequality is a straightforward application of Jensen’s Inequality. The second





















































Since Ψ is increasing and concave in P (see Proof of Theorem 1), the diﬀerence Ψ(P,αn,δ
αn)−
P must be decreasing in P. Therefore, P∗
αn >α P ∗
n which means that the MAC likelihood
exhibits increasing returns. We conclude the proof. ♦♦
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